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PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
In Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co.1 the defendant
pleaded the ten-year acquisitive prescription, and the only real
point of issue was about the "good faith" necessary for this pre-
scription, inasmuch as the other elements of legal possession
and just title were present. The defendant's good faith was
questioned on the ground that there had been a title examination
made in 1924 in connection with the transaction upon which
the plea of prescription rested. In the court of appeal's decision, 2
the emphasis was placed upon the issue of possession because
the property was open swampland, sometimes dry and some-
times water-covered; and its finding that there was legal pos-
session because the defendant had exercised possession in the
only mode possible for such land (cutting timber, paying taxes,
and so forth), was accepted by the Supreme Court. However,
the Supreme Court differed from the court of appeal in the
evaluation of the testimony of the man who had been treasurer
of the company at the time of the transaction in question. The
court of appeal found "that he did not remember whether they
got a written title opinion from attorneys or not but he defi-
nitely states that he did not know of any claim anybody was
making to the property until a short time before this lawsuit
was brought" ;3 therefore, the presumption of good faith4 was
sufficient. The Supreme Court thought differently, however,
for it found that this witness "was in the office being taught
the business, and knew all about the transaction as the matter
was handled by his father; he further stated unequivocally and
repeatedly, that the title to the property was examined at that
time, and recalled that one of the attorneys who represents his
company in this suit assisted in the examination of title, but did
not remember whether they received a title letter from the ex-
amining attorneys at that time." 5 The court then reiterated the
well-established principles that there is generally no duty to
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 La. 175, 81 So.2d 852 (1955).
2. 76 So.2d 328 (La. App. 1954).
3. Id. at 335.
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3481 (1870).
5. 228 La. 175, 81 So.2d 852, 854 (1955).
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make an investigation of the title, but if "instead of relying
on the faith of his vendor's title, he instituted an investigation
into its validity, he is then bound by what the record reveals and
cannot claim to be in good faith if the record discloses a defect
in the title of his vendor."
The question which emerges from this difference of evalua-
tion of testimony is what constitutes the kind of title examina-
tion which will rebut the presumption of good faith, as distin-
guished from the kind of inquiry or investigation about the
property which will not destroy the presumed good faith. It can
now be stated that it is not necessary to have received a written
legal opinion incorporating the results of a title examination.
However, it might go beyond what the Supreme Court intended
to establish if any inquiry by an attorney or notary is treated
as a title examination because that might almost exclude the
good faith prescription from operation altogether. The Louisi-
ana courts have often seemed to follow a liberal attitude in sus-
taining acquisitive prescription,T and this question of what con-
stitutes a "title examination" might bear some further specifica-
tion.
In Richardson & Bass v. Board of Levee Commissioners of
the Orleans Levee District the defendant tried to support its
claim to the land in question by the plea of ten-year acquisitive
prescription. A number of interesting differences appear in the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Justice McCaleb,
speaking for the majority, found that the defendant was in legal
bad faith because "it caused abstracts to be made of the titles
of all the lands it was acquiring under Act No. 99 of 1924 and
the titles were examined and approved by its general counsel."9
Justice Ponder placed a different interpretation upon the same
abstracts and he concluded that "the opinion of the general
counsel based on this information could not be considered a title
opinion .... There is nothing in this record to show that any
examination of the title is revealed therein."'10 As pointed out
in the preceding paragraph of these comments, it would be help-
6. Ibid.
7. E.g., Smith v.Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So.2d 335 (1943),
where a quitclaim deed was held to be sufficient basis for both good faith and
just title for the ten-year prescription.
8. 226 La. 761, 77 So.2d 32 (1954).
9. Id. at 776, 77 So.2d at 37.
10. Id. at 781, 77 So.2d at 39.
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ful to all concerned if more specific definition could be given to
"title examination" as it affects good or bad faith in the ten-
year acquisitive prescription.
On one point, Chief Justice Fournet (concurring) agreed
with Justice Ponder that the deed in question was translative
of title and was therefore a "just title" for purposes of prescrip-
tion, but the majority felt otherwise on the ground that the deed
did not contain an accurate description of the land in issue.
In the course of the majority opinion, reference was made to
a point which is worth noting and about which there did not
seem to be any disagreement. It was that "the constitutional
provision [article 16, section 6] for payment of the assessed
value to the owner for property used for levee purposes is
merely a gratuity given to the owner whose land is burdened
with the servitude imposed thereon by Article 665 of the Civil
Code. Hence, appropriation of such land by a Levee Board for
levee purposes neither conveys a title to the Board nor does
the payment of the assessed value to the owner operate as a
transfer of title." 11
Alba v. Smith12 was a partition action in which three co-
owners were resisted by the defendant who had acquired a frac-
tional interest in the property but who also contended for com-
plete ownership on the grounds of acquisitive prescription of
ten and thirty years. Apart from finding that he lacked legal
good faith for the ten-year prescription, and had in fact paid
rent for the use of the property during a certain period, the court
further- found that, when he acquired the fractional interest in
the property, he became a co-owner and, therefore, the rule that
prescription does not apply between co-owners was applicable.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
In Davis v. Lewis & Lewis13 damages were claimed as a re-
sult of an automobile collision which occurred on January 1,
1948. The suit was instituted on December 29, 1948, against the
owner of the other vehicle and against the defendant's unidenti-
fied liability insurance company through its local agent and
adjuster. The plaintiff was unable to obtain the name of the
11. Id. at 772, 77 So.2d at 35.
12. 228 La. 207, 81 So.2d 863 (1955).
13. 226 La. 1059, 78 So.2d 173 (1955).
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.insurance company until late in January, 1949, and at that time
amended his petition accordingly. The insurance company
pleaded the one-year prescription against tort actions. 1 4 The
court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal" which over-
ruled the plea of prescription on the grounds that the filing of
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction interrupted prescrip-
tion16 and that the insurer was represented by its agent who had
refused to disclose its identity. It would indeed be out of keeping
with established concepts of justice if such tactics were permitted
to succeed.
Article 351917 of the Civil Code appears under a heading "Of
the Causes Which Interrupt Prescription" but is only indirectly
related to the topic. A lawsuit constitutes a legal interruption
of prescription, but if no useful steps are taken for a period of
five years the suit is deemed to have been abandoned and the
interruption as having never happened. However, the abandon-
ment does not take effect ipso-jure. Consequently, the defendant
can by definite action on his part waive the right to claim
abandonment. In Green v. Small"5 this was held to have hap-
pened when defendant made an appearance, filed stipulations
recognizing the interests of various heirs and entered a plea of
prescription; later he also filed a motion for rehearing. Aban-
donment was likewise refused recently by the court of appeal
in a case 9 in which five years had elapsed without any steps
having been taken in the prosecution of an appeal. It was found
that the case was on the ordinary docket and had never been
reached for hearing, and the court felt that it would not be justi-
fied in dismissing the case. Instead, the case was transferred to
the preference docket and fixed for hearing in due course.
14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870).
15. 60 So.2d 230 (La. App. 1952).
16. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950).
17. "If the plaintiff in this case, after having made his demand, abandons or
discontinues it, the interruption shall be considered as having never happened.
"Whenever the plaintiff having made his demand shall at any time before
obtaining final judgment allow five years to elapse without having taken any
steps in the prosecution thereof, he shall be considered as having abandoned the
same.
"Any appeal, now or hereafter pending in any appellate court of the State, in
which five years have elapsed without any steps having been taken in the prose-
cution thereof, shall be considered as abandoned, and the court in Which said
appeal is pending shall summarily dismiss such appeal." As amended,, La. Acts
1954, No. 615, § 1, p. 1119.
18. 227 La. 401, 79 So.2d 497 (1955).
19. Veith v. Reynoir, 78 So.2d 543 (La. App. 1955).
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